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Although an increasing number of companies have publicly declared environmental targets 
(ETs), scant research has been conducted in this area. This study, therefore, investigates the 
extent of corporate environmental targets disclosure (ETD) and empirically examines whether 
environmental governance and performance influence the ETD of companies in the U.K. 
during the 2005-2013 period. We find that firms show a large degree of variability and 
inconsistency in their reporting of ETs. The results indicate that U.K. firms, particularly those 
with high environmental sensitivity, tend to disclose symbolic soft or semi-hard ETs to manage 
stakeholder perceptions and legitimize their existence. Moreover, Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) guidelines, sustainability committees, and sustainability assurance show positive 
relationships with ETD. We also find that U.K. firms that perform well environmentally are 
likely to set and disclose hard ETs. These results support stakeholder, legitimacy, and 
impression management theories. We suggest that there is a need for regulations that will not 
only enhance the usefulness of ETD but also encourage companies to take serious proactive 
action to reduce negative environmental impacts, possibly creating ‘win-win’ solutions. Our 
findings have important implications for policy-makers and various stakeholder groups. 
Keywords: Environmental targets; Environmental governance; Environmental performance; 












As the present situation appears to put the planet in jeopardy, there is a need for a 
new relationship between industry and the environment […] There is a need for a 
measurement system to assess industry’s impact. (Jones 2010, p. 123). 
Businesses pose a major threat to the environment because some of them do not support 
sustainable development, thus triggering enormous environmental damage (Arora & Lodhia, 
2017; Kessler et al., 2017; Tadros & Magnan, 2019). For example, approximately 4.2 million 
barrels of oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico despite attempts to plug the BP Deepwater Horizon 
oil leak (Kessler et al., 2017). Such an environmental disaster caused 11 deaths and 
considerable damage to wildlife, local coastal communities, and a number of fishing and 
tourism businesses that depended on the Gulf for their day-to-day activities (Arora & Lodhia, 
2017). It also raised questions about the business practices and ethics of companies globally. 
In essence, ongoing environmental crises (e.g., greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions, air pollution, 
water pollution, biodiversity loss, etc.) have made the ‘green economy’ an alternative economic 
model. In a green economy, ‘environmental, economic, and social policies and innovations 
enable society to use resources efficiently, enhancing human well-being in an inclusive manner 
while maintaining the natural systems that sustain us’ (European Environmental Agency 2013, 
p. 5; see also Jones, 2010; Schiemann & Sakhel, 2018). With this in mind, a question arises: 
how can we measure progress toward a green economy? The European Environmental Agency 
has stated that global environmental policy planning and implementation must transition from 
the strategic visions of countries and corporations into concrete targets to have a clear 
understanding of ‘where we stand and how we are progressing’ (European Environmental 
Agency, 2013, p. 5). The aim of this paper was thus to investigate the extent of corporate 
environmental targets disclosure (ETD) and also examine the influence of corporate 
environmental governance and performance on ETD practices in the U.K. 
As such, companies are expected (and in some cases required by legislation) to fulfill 
their responsibilities in minimizing future environmental impacts of their business activities 
(Pinkse & Kolk, 2009). One way of doing this is to measure the business impact on the 
environment. In this context, Jones (2010, p. 129) suggests that ‘a measurement per se makes 
visible what has previously been invisible and enables us to capture the otherwise hidden 
attributes of an object […] In business, one of the major measurement systems is quantification 
through accounting numbers. Such quantification helps us to understand and appraise corporate 
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activities and achievements whether they be financial or environmental.’ Accordingly, setting 
and reporting environmental targets (ETs) is an important mechanism of quantifying business 
environmental performance3. Additionally, it can be an early wake-up call to control and 
minimize potential environmental damage, thus moving businesses from conventional reactive 
roles in managing environmental crises toward more proactive actions (Herva et al., 2011; 
Maas, 2018; Tadros & Magnan, 2019).  
Various stakeholder groups, including environmentalists, regulators, investors, and 
governments, have put pressure on firms to adopt proactive environmental strategies and to 
disclose more useful information on their environmental performance (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; 
Clarkson et al., 2011). In response, an increasing number of firms are setting and disclosing 
ETs such as carbon emissions, energy consumption, and biodiversity-specific targets to 
minimize possible environmental threats and exploit green economic opportunities (Gouldson 
& Sullivan, 2013; Schiemann & Sakhel, 2018; Tauringana & Chithambo, 2015). In 2014, for 
example, approximately 81% of the world’s 500 largest companies reported publicly to the 
carbon disclosure project (CDP), disclosing emission reductions or environment-specific 
targets (CDP, 2015). Accordingly, environmental target disclosures (ETDs) are crucial to 
firms’ communications with stakeholders as they contain the information needed to evaluate 
risks associated with environmental performance (DEFRA, 2013).  
Setting corporate ETs and reporting on them is a crucial reflection of a firm’s 
commitment to sustainability4. ETs disclosures are critical company communications as they 
help stakeholders evaluate risks associated with environmental performance and enable a better 
understanding of progress toward company targets (DEFRA, 2013). ETs are defined as detailed 
plans to achieve future environmental performance requirements of an organization or parts 
thereof (ISO 14001, 2015). In addition, Haffar and Searcy (2018) described ETs as specific 
environmental performance objectives to be achieved within a specific timeframe. ETs may 
                                               
3 These environmental targets represent one aspect of the sustainability indicators of the economic, environmental, 
and social performance or impacts of an organization related to its material aspects (GRI, 2013). 
4 Some limitations are characterizing the target setting process. These limitations are mostly due to the difficulty 
of adopting a holistic and comprehensive view of a variety of environments as well as socio-economic dimensions 
(e.g. climate change, water resources, acidification, etc.). Indeed, the general limits of target setting can be, for 
example; the interplay between targets in different environmental impact categories; the coherence between 
targets set at the micro-scale and those set at the macro-scale; the acceptance of an “evidence-based” target. 
Targets are to be agreed upon the interests of the company management, shareholders, and the other non-
shareholders' stakeholders (see, for example, Maxwell et al. 2015; Rietbergen & Blok, 2010). 
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refer to either hard or soft targets (e.g., Haffar & Searcy, 2018; Jones & Slack, 2013; Maas, 
2018).  
Hard ETs are measurable targets with clear-cut underlying quantification and 
timeframes. For example, Kingfisher’s U.K. established a target to ‘achieve a 20% reduction 
in carbon emissions from dedicated store delivery and home delivery fleets from a 2010-11 
baseline by 2020’ (Kingfisher’s CSR Report 2012, p. 110). In this case, the target is clearly 
defined, quantified, and has a specific timeframe. ETs should be quantified to establish 
accountability. A quantified ET motivates firms to monitor, evaluate, and adjust their behaviors 
by providing feedback on achievement and monitoring compliance (Rietbergen & Blok, 2010). 
For example, as described by Maxwell et al. (2015, p. 1075), a sustainable development goal 
set by the United Nations is to ‘halt the loss of biodiversity’. Although this target is clearly 
defined, and it specifies that there must be zero biodiversity loss, measuring changes in 
biodiversity is extremely difficult. Hence, the target quantification is difficult, and no one is 
accountable. ETs can be measured either as absolute targets (e.g. numerically, such as reducing 
the carbon footprint by 200 tons by 2020 against a 2007 baseline) or as intensity targets (e.g. 
as a percentage, such as reducing carbon emission from the transport fleet by 50% per case 
delivered by 2020 against a 2007 baseline) (Carbon Trust, 2011; CDP, 2015). Moreover, each 
ET should have a timeframe to achieve the planned outcome because a lack of timeframes 
demotivates firms (Rietbergen & Blok, 2010). For example, Marks & Spencer U.K. agreed to 
make its target to ‘reduce store energy carbon emissions by a further 20%’ (Marks & Spencer 
CSR Report 2006, p. 25). Although this target is clearly defined and quantified, it does not 
have a clear timeframe. 
In contrast, soft ETs are generic, do not have clear-cut underlying quantifications, and 
are not time-bound. For example, Lloyds Bank U.K. made its target to ‘reduce the overall waste 
created’ (Lloyds Bank CSR Report 2008, p. 22). Although this target is clearly defined, it is 
difficult to measure the overall reduction of waste. Accounting literature (Jones & Slack, 2013; 
Maas, 2018) states that soft ETs are less accurate and reliable compared to hard ETs because 
they are less manageable, less objective, and often influenced by firms’ biases. 
While there has been a significant growth in the literature on corporate environmental 
disclosures (Helfaya et al., 2019; Michelon et al., 2015; Rodrigue et al., 2013), little is known 
about ETs (Jones & Slack, 2013). This raises a number of questions on the disclosure of ETs: 
whether they are soft, hard, or semi-hard targets, measured as absolute or intensity, and what 
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environmental areas do they cover. These features can reveal the extent to which a company is 
serious about dealing with its environmental impacts, which reflect its responsibility. With this 
in mind, this study attempts to bridge the existing gap in the corporate environmental disclosure 
literature through an in-depth examination of corporate ETs disclosed by U.K. FTSE100 
companies for nine years from 2005 to 2013. Specifically, we examine the extent of ETD (in 
terms of number of ETs disclosed) and nature (in terms of the three specified types of ETs: 
soft, semi-hard and hard targets).  
Furthermore, environmental governance mechanisms play a critical role in enhancing 
firms’ environmental disclosures (Peters & Romi, 2014). Extant literature suggests that the 
more proactive and comprehensive the environmental governance of a firm is, the higher the 
level of its environmental disclosure (Jaggi et al., 2017; Liao et al., 2015; Peters & Romi, 2014). 
However, Michelon et al. (2015) find that environmental governance mechanisms (i.e., 
standalone sustainability reports, assurances, and Global Reporting Initiative [GRI] guidelines) 
largely remain inactive in enhancing the disclosure of a firm’s environmental activities, 
suggesting that these practices may be adopted symbolically rather than substantively to 
appease the stakeholders. Moreover, the empirical evidence on the relationship between 
environmental performance and environmental disclosure is mixed (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; 
Alrazi et al., 2016; Clarkson et al., 2008; Qiu et al., 2016). Our study is the first study to 
investigate corporate ETDs and their determinants. In particular, we fill this research gap by 
investigating whether firm-level environmental governance mechanisms (i.e., sustainability 
committee, GRI framework, and sustainability assurance) and environmental performance 
influence and enhance corporate ETDs.  
Our empirical results show that U.K. firms, particularly those in highly polluting 
industries, tend to disclose symbolic soft or semi-hard ETs to manage their public image and 
legitimize their existence. We also find that firms pay less attention to ETDs on environmental 
protection expenditures, biodiversity impacts, and fines for non-compliance with 
environmental regulations. This largely supports impression management theory that states 
firms may focus on symbolic commitments rather than substantive future plans for green 
investments. Furthermore, our estimation results suggest that the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) guidelines, sustainability committees, and sustainability assurance have positive 
associations with the extent of ETD. Finally, we find that U.K. firms that perform well 
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environmentally are likely to set and disclose hard ETs. These results support stakeholder, 
legitimacy, and impression management theories. 
This study makes a number of contributions to the literature on corporate environmental 
disclosure and governance. First, it offers novel longitudinal insights into the relatively 
unexplored area of ETD over a long-time horizon (2005-2013), thus shedding light on how 
companies use ETs in their reporting. Secondly, it is among the first to empirically examine 
the influence of environmental governance mechanisms on a firm’s ETDs. Thirdly, we 
complement existing studies (e.g., Alrazi et al., 2016; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 
2011; Peters & Romi, 2014; Rodrigue et al., 2013) by investigating whether environmental 
performance and the industry’s environmental sensitivity influence the extent of corporate 
ETDs. Finally, our results will help with decision- and policy-making in developing guidelines 
and rules, not only to enhance the usefulness of corporate ETDs but also to incentivize 
companies to take serious proactive actions to alleviate negative environmental impacts.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the multi-
theoretical framework for corporate ETDs and discusses hypotheses development. Section 3 
discusses the data, variables, and empirical models. Section 4 presents the empirical results and 
Section 5 offers the conclusion.  
2. Background and Hypotheses Development 
2.1. Theoretical Framework  
Research on environmental responsibility has increased significantly in the recent few years, 
with most of it relying largely on theoretical perspectives such as stakeholder, legitimacy, 
agency, impression management, or institutional theory (Alrazi et al., 2016; Cooper & Slack, 
2015; Fernando & Lawrence, 2014; Helfaya & Whittington, 2019). According to Phillips 
(2003, p. 25), a stakeholder is any individual or group of individuals that is the legitimate object 
of managerial or organizational attention. Legitimacy, therefore, is central to the common 
understanding of the stakeholder since some organizational groups are legitimate objects of 
attention while others are not (Phillips, 2003). Impression management is also closely related 
to stakeholder and legitimacy theories; it proves that narrative environmental disclosures in 
annual and/or sustainability reports provide organizations with effective tools to manage 
stakeholder perceptions (Cooper & Slack, 2015; Leung et al., 2015; Neu et al., 1998; Talbot & 
Boiral, 2016). In this study, we use a multi-theoretical framework that comprises stakeholder, 
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legitimacy, and impression management as the basis to understand and explain the behavior of 
corporate ETDs. 
Stakeholder theory is a frequently adopted theoretical perspective focusing on the need 
to manage particular stakeholder groups that have the power to provide firms with the required 
resources (Deegan, 2007; Fernando & Lawrence, 2014; Helfaya et al., 2019; Tilt, 2007; 
Unerman et al., 2007). To ensure sustainability, a company must seek and maintain the support 
of its stakeholders. Thus, the environmental disclosure practice is considered as part of the 
dialogue between the company and its stakeholders (Phillips, 2003; Unerman et al., 2007). 
Deegan and Unerman (2006) developed four broad stages of the disclosure process: ‘why, who, 
for what, and how’ to understand why stakeholder engagement is a crucial factor in 
environmental disclosures. The ‘why’ stage defines a company’s motivation to engage in 
environmental disclosure (e.g., setting and disclosing ETs); ‘who’ identifies the stakeholders a 
company needs to address in the disclosure process (e.g., setting ETs as a response to previous 
dialogue with stakeholders or modifying current ETs). Then, the ‘for what’ stage denotes the 
stakeholder engagement and dialogue in which stakeholder expectations are identified and 
prioritized; and the ‘how’ stage contains the mechanisms and reports.  
Secondly, legitimacy theory posits that firms can gain social acceptance and legitimize 
their corporate activities by engaging in environmental disclosure practices (Cho & Patten, 
2007; Fernando & Lawrence, 2014; Van Staden & Hooks, 2007). According to Fernando and 
Lawrence (2014), corporate legitimation strategies are used to gain and maintain legitimacy 
(i.e., proactive strategy by a good performer [the good apple]). These strategies may also be 
used to repair legitimacy after a specific environmental accident (i.e., reactive strategy to clear 
the bad image by a poor performer [the bad apple]) (Moussa et al., 2020; Alrazi et al., 2016; 
Menguc et al., 2010; Samkin & Schneider, 2010). Companies adopt these strategies either to 
meet the wider range of information about their environmental performance and strategies 
demanded by stakeholders or to offset negative media coverage of current environmental 
problems by drawing attention to their strengths and strategic targets (Alrazi et al., 2016; 
Helfaya et al., 2019; Menguc et al., 2010; Moussa et al., 2020; Samkin & Schneider, 2010). 
Thirdly, the impression management theory considers environmental disclosure as a 
tool to manage a company’s image and enhance its legitimacy through communications on its 
outputs, goals, or methods of operations. According to Goffman (1959), impression 
management theory refers to the process through which companies and people attempt to 
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control or manipulate the reactions of others (e.g., stakeholders and relevant parties) to achieve 
their intended goals (Boiral, 2016; Cooper & Slack, 2015; Leung et al., 2015; Talbot & Boiral, 
2016). Impression management theorists state that the primary motive of managers is to 
manage stakeholders’ perceptions of their companies and to avoid being viewed unfavorably 
(Cho et al., 2012; Cooper & Slack, 2015; Leung et al., 2015; Lu & Abeysekera, 2014). 
Similarly, Schlenker (1980) stated that the two main motives that influence individuals to 
engage in impression management are instrumental and expressive motives. Instrumental 
motives involve the desire to influence others and gain rewards out of that, whereas expressive 
motives entail constructing an image and living up to that image. According to the literature 
on environmental disclosures, managers use environmental disclosures to manage a company’s 
image and enhance its legitimacy through communications on its output, goals, or methods of 
operations (Lu & Abeysekera, 2014; Neu et al., 1998; Talbot & Boiral, 2016). Managers prefer 
to disclose achieved ETs (i.e., good environmental performance news) rather than unachieved 
ones (i.e., bad environmental performance news), implying that environmental disclosures are 
mainly self-laudatory (Hackston & Milne, 1996; Hooghiemstra, 2000; Ogden & Clarke, 2005). 
Therefore, more detailed information and explanations of corporate performance, tactics, 
strategies, and levels of target achievement can be an impression management tool to narrow 
the gap between managers and stakeholders and improve the effectiveness of decisions. 
All these three theories assume that companies operate in a society that affects their 
practices and the society has resources they need. To receive these resources, companies must 
meet societal expectations. Thus, corporate disclosures can be used to manage corporate 
reputations and to convince society that companies act in accordance with that society’s (or 
other specific stakeholders’) expectations. This study uses these three theories to provide 
complementary descriptions and explanations of ETD practices. Legitimacy theory emphasizes 
the disparity between environmental values and corporate activities, resulting in a legitimacy 
gap. In this study, legitimacy theory explains why companies attempt to respond to external 
expectations and close the legitimacy gap through strategic release of ETDs. Accordingly, 
ETDs could be released more frequently, to where there is a greater need to conform to 
environmental standards. Stakeholder theory highlights stakeholders’ power and importance to 
a company’s operations. As a result, the ETDs and tactical information are used as a tool to 
manage stakeholders’ perceptions. Lastly, impression management describes and explains a 
company’s use of an ETD as an attempt to control its image through communication tools and 
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includes benchmarking comparisons. Therefore, these theories connect and complement each 
other through different levels of emphasis and provide comprehensive knowledge of ETDs. 
2.2. Hypotheses Development 
From a theoretical perspective, contemporary literature highlights the significance of multiple 
theories in explaining corporate sustainability reporting and assurance practices (Al-Shaer & 
Zaman, 2018; Cohen & Simnett, 2015; Helfaya & Moussa, 2017; Leung et al. 2015). In 
particular, legitimacy, stakeholder, and impression management theories contribute to the 
understanding of previous findings on the adoption, outcome, and process of sustainability 
reporting (Meng et al., 2014; O’Dwyer et al. 2011; Talbot & Boiral 2016). As indicated by the 
term ETD itself, companies try to communicate their environmental strategies and targets to 
obtain stakeholder appreciation of the company’s transparency efforts and thus maintain or 
increase its legitimacy (Helfaya et al., 2019; Moussa et al., 2020). Additionally, impression 
management theory implies that sustainability reporting serves as a tool to influence 
stakeholder perceptions about the company’s behavior and performance and attempts to 
convince report readers of the company’s environmental responsibility (Lu & Abeysekera, 
2014; Neu et al., 1998).  
Given its emerging nature, there is little research directly addressing ETD practices and 
determinants. This is therefore one of the first studies to examine how firm-level environmental 
governance (such as sustainability committee, GRI framework and sustainability assurance), 
environmental performance and the overall industry’s environmental risks influence the extent 
of corporate ETD. We discuss each of these determinants and develop testable hypotheses in 
turn. 
2.2.1. Sustainability Committee 
One of the key environmental governance mechanisms is establishing an environmental 
committee (i.e., sustainability committee5) to manage environmental activities that might help 
firms maintain their social license and meet stakeholders’ expectations (Helfaya & Moussa, 
2017; Jaggi et al., 2017; Peters & Romi, 2015). The sustainability committee’s function 
typically includes managing the quality of the company’s stakeholder engagement process and 
                                               
5 Many other names are used to refer to sustainability committees including ‘environmental,’ ‘corporate social 
responsibility,’ ‘corporate ethics,’ ‘environmental health and safety,’ or ‘sustainable development’ committee 
(Helfaya & Moussa 2017; Peters & Romi 2015). 
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sustainability policies and monitoring disclosures provided to stakeholders (Helfaya & 
Moussa, 2017; Michelon et al., 2015; Peters & Romi, 2015). The existence of a sustainability 
committee can increase the credibility of sustainability reports because it is expected to address 
environmental controls and risks, targets and strategic opportunities, and commitments to 
stakeholders (Al-shaer & Zaman, 2018; Rodrigue et al., (20136). Cowen et al. (1987) pointed 
out that the sustainability committee is key to legitimately reacting or proacting to social and 
environmental pressures, consequently increasing a firm’s level of environmental 
responsibility disclosure and managing a company’s image through its communications on 
environmental strategies and goals (also Lu & Abeysekera, 2014; Neu et al., 1998; Zhou et al., 
2017). In this respect, the concept of legitimacy provides guidelines for directors in identifying 
stakeholders and recognizing their heterogeneous expectations (Helfaya & Moussa, 2017). 
Rodrigue et al. (2013) investigated whether sustainability committees play substantial or 
symbolic roles in environmental performance and disclosure and asserted that the committees 
emphasize the avoidance of reputational risk and litigation costs, thus affecting the quality of 
environmental disclosure. Peters and Romi (2014) and Liao et al. (2015) found that the 
sustainability committee enhances disclosure of GHG emissions, suggesting that it can play 
a crucial role in addressing environmental issues from the perspectives of challenges, 
opportunities, and engagement with stakeholders (Jaggi et al., 2017). Recently, Helfaya and 
Moussa (2017) found that such a committee is significantly positively associated with the 
quality of environmental disclosures. In contrast, Rankin et al. (2011) found no relationship 
between sustainability committees and the propensity for GHG disclosure in Australian firms.  
Based on the above theoretical arguments and empirical evidences, we posit that the 
existence of a sustainability committee motivates a firm to take a more proactive role in 
managing environmental risks and thus is more likely to respond to stakeholder demands for 
transparency by disclosing more and relevant ETs information. Therefore, our first hypothesis 
is: 
H1.  There is a positive association between the existence of a sustainability committee 
and the extent of corporate environmental targets disclosures. 
                                               
6 The role of the sustainability committee is to 'review and advise the Board on Shell’s strategy, policies, and 
performance in the areas of safety, environment, ethics, and reputation. It regularly discusses the company’s 
approach to combatting climate change. In 2018, this included the energy transition, GHG emission targets 
(including advice to the Remuneration Committee), policy on methane, Shell’s Net Carbon Footprint, and nature-
based solutions’ (Shell Annual Report, 2018, p. 71). 
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2.2.2. GRI guidelines 
Stakeholder theory considers sustainability reporting as a communication tool used to outline 
companies’ environmental plans and convey their environmental transparency (Fernandez-
Feijoo et al., 2014). Legitimacy theory, on the other hand, posits that the legitimacy of a 
company depends on an implicit social contract between the company and the society it serves 
(Deegan, 2007; Helfaya & Moussa, 2017). Companies can therefore lose their license to 
operate if they break societal norms and expectations. Accordingly, legitimacy theory predicts 
that companies adopt environmental reporting to legitimize their operations when societal 
norms and expectations of their actions change (Deegan, 2007; Lu et al., 2017). The GRI 
describes sustainability reporting as the practice of measuring economic, social, and 
environmental performance for internal and external stakeholders (Aras & Crowther, 2008; 
Comyns, 2016; GRI, 2013; Helfaya & Kotb, 2016).   
In practice, the GRI guidelines are the most widely acknowledged (Comyns, 2016; 
Mahoney et al., 2013; Talbot & Boiral, 2016). According to KPMG (2015), 74% of the world’s 
250 largest companies in 45 countries adhere to GRI guidelines. Joseph (2012) stated that the 
GRI framework is extensively applied in multinational companies across different industries. 
Companies that adopt GRI guidelines seem to be more committed to environmental 
responsibility than companies that do not (Comyns, 2016; Michelon et al., 2015; Talbot & 
Boiral, 2016). Additionally, companies abiding by the guidelines are required to disseminate 
‘transparent and comprehensive’ information to stakeholders on their environmental 
performance and the environmental consequences of their business operations (Chauvey et al., 
2015; Helfaya & Kotb, 2016; Zhou et al., 2017). Companies tend to use an accepted 
international standard for sustainability reporting, such as the GRI framework, to enhance 
environmental disclosures (Aras & Crowther, 2008; Michelon et al., 2015). 
Given the importance of GRI guidelines as a management tool that can help companies 
reduce reputational risks and build stronger stakeholder relationships, it can be argued that the 
adoption of GRI framework enhances the extent of corporate ETDs. Thus, our second 
hypothesis is: 
H2.  There is a positive association between the adoption of GRI guidelines and the 




2.2.3. Sustainability Assurance  
According to stakeholder and legitimacy perspectives, companies seek independent third-party 
assurance for their sustainability disclosures to prove their commitment to society and 
environment, thus enhancing their legitimacy and building trust with various stakeholder 
groups (Cohen & Simnett, 2015; Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2014; Michelon et al., 2015; 
O’Dwyer et al., 2011; Peters & Romi, 2015; Simnett et al., 2009a, 2009b). Hence, the external 
assurance of a report is a key element in increasing stakeholder confidence in the quality and 
completeness of the sustainability performance information (Birkey et al., 2016; Fernandez-
Feijoo et al., 2014). It is also regarded as a tool for inspiring the trust of readers of corporate 
environmental reports on strategies and performances (Cooper & Slack, 2015; Talbot & Boiral, 
2016). In contrast to a statutory financial reporting audit, third-party assurance for 
sustainability disclosure is voluntary and unregulated. With the exception of South Africa and 
France among the 45 countries surveyed in a 2015 KPMG report, third-party assurance has no 
universally accepted standards to guide the certification process, and there are rules on who 
should provide this specialized service (Helfaya and Kotb, 2016; Michelon et al., 2018). 
According to the report, 42% of N100 companies assured their sustainability reporting; 50% 
chose to assure their whole report (not just select some performance indicators or sections), 
and 64% of those assuring their reports opted for major accounting firms to provide the 
assurance service. Assurance rates among the world’s G250 top companies have shown a 
sloping point with more than half (63%) of firms reporting on sustainability now choosing 
assurance, an increase from 59% in 2013 (KPMG, 2015).  
A number of empirical studies have documented the importance of a rigorous 
independent assertion process to assure stakeholders of the credibility and completeness of the 
sustainability disclosure (Birkey et al., 2016; Michelon et al., 2018; Peters & Romi, 2015; 
Wong & Millington, 2014). For example, Wong and Millington (2014) found that stakeholder 
pressure promotes assurance and specialist assurers, or consultants are preferable to auditors 
because of their independence and experience. Similarly, some studies have found that 
assurance allows stakeholders to be progressively engaged in the sustainability disclosure 
process, changes the attitudes of executives toward the disclosures (Edgley et al., 2010), and 
improves the quality of environmental disclosures (Coram et al., 2009; O’Dwyer & Owen, 
2005; Simnett et al., 2009a, 2009b). Consequently, third-party assurance of sustainability 
information tends to improve the ETD practices through ongoing dialogue between 
management and stakeholders. Thus, our third hypothesis is:  
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H3.  There is a positive association between sustainability assurance and the extent of 
corporate environmental targets disclosures. 
2.2.4. Environmental Performance 
Stakeholder acceptance plays a central role in the concept of corporate legitimacy, and it 
includes a wide range of legitimate individuals and groups with influence on or being 
influenced by a company’s activities (Alrazi et al., 2016; Helfaya & Whittington, 2019; Tadros 
& Magnan, 2019). Therefore, some of these individuals and/or groups are concerned about the 
environment and demand companies to disclose more information on their environmental 
performance and goals that reflect the extent to which they are take responsibilities (Alrazi et 
al., 2016; Clarkson et al., 2011; Cho et al., 2010; Meng et al., 2014). According to legitimacy 
theory, companies disclose a wider range of information about their environmental 
performance and strategies to meet demands of stakeholders and/or to provide information to 
offset negative media exposure about current environmental problems by drawing attention to 
their strengths and strategic targets (Alrazi et al., 2016; Helfaya & Moussa, 2017; Menguc et 
al., 2010; Samkin & Schneider, 2010). Additionally, impression management theorists argue 
that managers use environmental disclosures as an assertive tactic to manage stakeholder 
perceptions or as a defensive tactic to justify poor performance and communicate their targets 
to fix the poor performance (Cooper & Slack 2015, Leung et al. 2015; Tadros & Magnan, 
2019). 
Empirical studies on the link between environmental disclosure and performance have 
had mixed results (Alrazi et al., 2016; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008; Patten, 
2002). For example, Alrazi et al. (2016) and Qiu et al. (2016) found that environmental 
performance does not influence environmental disclosure. Other scholars have documented a 
negative relationship between environmental disclosure and good environmental performance 
(Clarkson et al., 2011; Patten, 2002). However, in an analysis of 198 of Standard and Poor’s 
500 firms, Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) found that high environmental performance is significantly 
related to extensive quantifiable environmental disclosures. Similarly, Meng et al. (2014) found 
that poor environmental performers disclosed more soft information on environmental 
performance and good performers disclosed more solid information. Additionally, they found 
that although poor performers increased disclosure after exposure as environmental violators, 
they avoided disclosing negative environmental information such as violations and associated 
penalties (Meng et al., 2014; see, also, Clarkson et al., 2011). Thus, based on stakeholder, 
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legitimacy, and impression management theory arguments and related empirical evidence, our 
fourth hypothesis is:  
H4.  There is a positive association between environmental performance and the extent 
of corporate environmental targets disclosures. 
2.2.5. Environmental Sensitivity of Industries 
Industrial environmental impacts have been recognized by a number of theoretical and 
empirical studies as key determinants of environmental disclosure practices (Barbu et al., 2014; 
Cho & Patten, 2007; Cormier & Magnan, 2015; Cuganesan et al., 2010; Helfaya & 
Whittington, 2019). Different industries have their own characteristics that relate to risks for 
both the environment and society (Cuganesan et al., 2010; Guthrie et al., 2008). For example, 
companies in oil and gas, mining, and chemical industrial sectors are associated with the lowest 
environmental performance and the highest environmental risk (Cho & Roberts, 2010; Helfaya 
& Whittington, 2019). Recently, several ecological disasters have been triggered by businesses 
within these sectors (BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill) (Helfaya et al., 2019). At the other extreme, 
service industries (e.g., banking) often have the lowest environmental impacts. According to 
stakeholder and legitimacy perspectives, environmental disclosure is seen as one of the 
strategies companies use to seek approval of their activities and performance from the 
community (Barbu et al., 2014; Cooper & Slack 2015; Cormier & Magnan, 2015; Jaggi et al., 
2017).  
Studies on the effect of a company’s industry on environmental disclosure have also 
had mixed results. For example, Cuganesan et al. (2010) found that companies in highly 
environmentally sensitive industries are likely to exhibit higher levels of environmental 
disclosure. Consumer-based firms can be expected to show greater concern in their social 
responsibility since this is likely to improve their corporate image and increase revenues 
(Cowen et al., 1987). Guthrie et al. (2008) argued that corporations in industries that change 
the environment, such as extractive industries, are more likely to report and disclose their 
environmental information than those in other industries. Campbell et al. (2003) measured the 
voluntary social disclosure that represented an attempt to close the perceived legitimacy gap 
between companies and stakeholders and found that that the quantity and quality of disclosures 
depends on whether a firm’s main product has commonly perceived negative implications (e.g., 
the tobacco industry). KPMG’s 2015 survey reported that big firms (N100 corporations) in the 
mining, technology, media, telecommunications, utilities, automotive, oil and gas, food and 
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beverage, and personal and household goods sectors produce the highest sustainability 
reporting at rates of 75% or higher. The sectors leading the way in sustainability reporting 
continue to be the heavy and traditionally polluting industries. Firms in industries with low 
environmental impacts such as financial services achieve relatively high rates of sustainability 
reporting. Other studies found that companies in industries with lower environmental impacts 
and apparent legitimacy gaps regularly engage in higher levels of environmental disclosure 
(Campbell et al., 2003).  
According to stakeholder, legitimacy, and impression management arguments and 
related empirical evidence, we posit that firms in highly environmentally sensitive industries 
that are regulated and are more visible to stakeholders and media pressure are more likely to 
enhance corporate ETDs. Thus, our final hypothesis is: 
H5.  There is a positive association between the level of environmental sensitivity of 
industries and the extent of corporate environmental targets disclosures. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Sample and Data Collection 
Our initial sample consists of the FTSE100 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange that are 
available in the DataStream database from 2005 to 2013. This period has witnessed a growing 
trend in regulations and initiatives requiring U.K. companies to publish ETs information (see, 
for example, Climate Change Act 2008; DEFRA 2013). We chose these firms because the 
FTSE100 is one of the world’s best-known stock market indices and a bellwether for the U.K. 
economy. It also includes a wide range of industry sectors and our sample represents 10 of the 
sectors. Of the companies initially in our sample, 36 firm-year observations were excluded 
because sustainability reporting was not available. An additional 41 firm-year observations 
were excluded because financial and governance data were missing. This has left us with 823 
firm-year observations. Table 1 presents the sample selection process (Panel A) and the sample 
distribution by industry (Panel B). 
We examine the ETDs made through any particular type of published sustainability 
reports, whether standalone sustainability reports (SR) or sustainability disclosures sections 
within the annual reports (AR). ETs are hand-collected from SRs or ARs. We also collect both 
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environmental governance-related indicators and environmental performance data from 
Thomson Reuters ASSET4, a leading global database on social, environmental, and corporate 
governance information (Qiu et al., 2016; Haque, 2017; Helfaya & Moussa, 2017; Moussa et 
al., 2020). Corporate governance and financial data are collected from the 
DataStream/Worldscope database.  
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
3.2. Variables Measurement 
3.2.1. Dependent variables 
3.2.1.1. Content analysis to measure the extent of ETDs. Consistent with previous studies 
(Haffar & Searcy, 2018; Beattie, 2014; Dobler et al., 2015), we use a content analysis method 
to measure the extent of corporate ETDs. Content analysis is a research technique to make 
replicable and valid inferences by describing and quantifying specific phenomena 
(Krippendorff, 2004). Fig. 1 shows the phases of the content analysis of firms’ sustainability 
or annual reports used to capture firms’ ETDs.  
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
The first phase is defining the coding unit. Following Jones and Slack (2013), ET is 
chosen as a coding unit because the data is considered to be more relevant and meaningful to 
measure ETD than words, sentences, or pages. This starts with defining the firm’s ‘target’ as a 
specific performance objective planned to be achieved (Haffar & Searcy, 2018; ISO 14001, 
2015). In the same vein, we develop an environmental content index based on GRI 
sustainability reporting guidelines7 (GRI, 2013) to extract firms’ ETDs. Our index comprises 
12 environmental categories: emissions; effluents and waste; energy; materials; supplier 
environmental assessment; water; products and services; biodiversity; transport; compliance; 
environmental grievance mechanisms; and environmental protection expenditures and 
investments. This is followed by searching firms’ sustainability or annual reports for ETs for 
our disclosure index. 
                                               
7 GRI is one of the main international benchmarks for firms interested in the disclosure of environmental 
performance and it is the most widely used in the U.K. and globally (KPMG, 2015). 
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The second phase defines classification criteria for each ET. As discussed earlier, there 
are two significant aspects to setting and reporting high-quality ETs information. The first is 
the quantification of ETs information (i.e., whether the ETs are measurable and qualitative or 
quantitative). ETs are expected to be measurable to create accountability for progress toward 
the agreed ETs. A measurable ET, for instance, helps motivate firms to monitor, evaluate, and 
adjust their behaviors through feedback on ET progress or monitoring compliance (Rietbergen 
& Blo 2010). The second aspect is the timeframe for the planned ETs. If ETs do not have 
timeframes, firms will be demotivated (Rietbergen & Blok 2010). Hence, in our study we 
classify ETDs into four categories: (i) generic targets (ET1); (ii) timed but not quantified targets 
(ET2); (iii) quantified but not timed targets (ET3); and (iv) quantified and timed targets (ET4). 
These themes are further combined and reclassified as hard, semi-hard, and soft ETDs (Haffar 
& Searcy, 2018; Jones & Slack, 2013; Maas, 2018). High-quality ET information can be 
characterized as ‘hard,’ meaning measurable (i.e., quantitative) and time-bound. ‘Soft’ ETs are 
neither measurable (i.e., qualitative) nor time-bound, which could result in a failure to guide, 
motivate, or regulate the activities needed to meet the targets. Therefore, we consider 
information on generic targets without clear-cut underlying quantification or timeframes (ET1) 
as soft disclosures; information on targets with timeframes that are not quantified (ET2) or 
quantified targets that are not timed (ET3) as semi-hard disclosures; and information on 
quantified targets with specific timeframes (ET4) as hard disclosures. Table 2 contains 
examples of some of the ETs identified from firms’ sustainability or annual reports. The 
examples also show how these ETs are classified and coded. 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
The next procedure is designed to score and weight ETs and each sub-category, 
assigning a higher score to high-quality ETs disclosures (i.e., hard targets) and a lower score 
to generic ETs information (i.e., soft targets). ETs are coded on a 0-4 scale, whereby 0 denotes 
‘no ET disclosure’; 1 denotes ‘soft targets’; 2 denotes ‘timed but not quantified ETs disclosure’ 
(ET2); 3 denotes ‘quantified but not timed ETs disclosure’ (ET3); and 4 denotes ‘quantified and 
timed ETs disclosure’ (hard targets) (Alrazi et al., 2016; Clarkson et al., 2011; Dobler et al., 
2015; Van Staden & Hooks, 2007). We assign a higher score to ET3 than ET2 because ‘what 
you can measure, you can manage.’ Finally, we compute an aggregate score for environmental 
targets disclosure (AETD) for each firm using the following formula: 
AETD = ∑ (ET1 * 1 + ET2 * 2 + ET3 * 3 + ET4 * 4) 
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3.2.1.2. The reliability and validity of ETD scores. To check the reliability and validity of the 
ETD scores, three tests are conducted. First, a pilot test is carried out to test the extraction of 
ETs and to ensure that the coding rules are standardized across the researchers (Krippendorff, 
2004). To this end, we examine sustainability reports or annual reports for 10 randomly 
selected firms. All reports are independently coded, classified, and checked by two researchers. 
Any inconsistencies are re-analyzed and resolved by discussion between the three researchers 
(Dobler et al., 2015). After confirming the usability of the ET coding, data are collected 
separately by the first and third researchers while the second researcher assesses the accuracy 
and consistency of their coding (Krippendorff, 2004; Dobler et al., 2015). The content of a few 
firms’ sustainability reports is then analyzed at a later date to confirm if the initial ET categories 
are identified, and their measurements are stable over time (Krippendorff, 2004). The scores 
from the second phase match those yielded in the first round, suggesting that the results are 
replicable. Finally, we use Cronbach’s alpha test to evaluate the internal consistency of the 
ETD scores (Cronbach’s alpha equals 83.5%) and find that it is acceptable given the generally 
agreed upon social science measure of 70% (Field, 2013). We conclude that the computed ETD 
scores are reliable. 
3.2.2 Independent variables 
We use the existence of a sustainability committee (SC), adoption of GRI guidelines (GRI), 
and inclusion of an external sustainability assurance statement (SA) as environmental 
governance-related variables in the regression model (Liao et al., 2015; Michelon et al., 2015; 
Qiu et al., 2016; Shaukat et al., 2016). The existence of an SC is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if the company has an SC or a director in charge of sustainability issues and 0 if otherwise 
(Mallin & Michelon, 2011; Rankin et al., 2011). To measure the effects of SA, we use a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if there is an assurance statement and 0 if otherwise. GRI is measured as 
the percentage of compliance with GRI sustainability reporting guidelines (e.g., Birkey et al., 
2016; Michelon et al., 2015).  
In line with prior studies (Michelon et al., 2015; Qiu et al., 2016; Shaukat et al., 2016), 
we measure environmental performance (ENVP) using an aggregated environmental score 
provided by the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. ASSET4 provides largely objective, 
relevant, and systematic environmental, social, and governance (ESG) measures based on more 
than 250 indicators to measure firms’ sustainability performances. According to ASSET4, an 
environmental score measures ‘a company’s impact on living and non-living natural systems, 
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including the air, land, and water, as well as complete ecosystems. It reflects how well a 
company uses best management practices to avoid environmental risks and capitalize on 
environmental opportunities’. The scores are normalized using z-scoring (lies between 0 and 
100%), equally weighted, and benchmarked against the complete universe of companies. The 
higher the score, the better the firm’s environmental performance is likely to be. 
We further account for environmental sensitivity of the industry (ESI). Unlike prior 
research (Peters & Romi, 2014; Michelon et al., 2015; Birkey et al., 2016), which narrows the 
categorization of industries into high and low environmentally sensitive companies, we follow 
Helfaya and Whittington’s (2019) approach. Thus, we classify industry effects into three 
categories: high environmentally sensitive industries (HESI), which represent chemicals, 
paper, metals, petroleum, mining, tobacco, general industry, and utilities; medium 
environmentally sensitive industries (MESI), which represent communication, health care, 
travel and leisure, media, and technology; and low environmentally sensitive industries (LESI), 
which represent banks, insurance, financial services, and real estate investment trusts. 
3.2.3 Control variables 
To control for potential omitted variables bias (Gujarati, 2003), we include a number of control 
variables representing firm-specific characteristics and governance mechanisms that may 
affect a firm’s ETD, including firm size (FSIZE) measured as the natural logarithm of firm 
assets (Alrazi et al., 2016; Liao et al., 2015; Michelon et al., 2015). The issuance of SR is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the company issues a standalone SR and 0 if otherwise 
(Helfaya & Moussa, 2017; Michelon et al., 2015). A firm’s profitability is measured by return 
on equity (ROE) (Qiu et al., 2016; Shaukat et al., 2016), and a firm’s leverage (LEV) is 
measured through the ratio of total debts to total assets (Michelon et al., 2015; Peters & Romi, 
2014). In line with prior studies (Helfaya & Moussa, 2017; Tauringana & Chithambo, 2015), 
we also control for the effect of financial slack (SLACK). Firms with higher levels of SLACK 
resources (the ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets) are likely to invest in sustainability 
activities, leading to an improvement in the firm’s ETD. Similarly, we control for a firm’s 
financial performance in the form of Tobin’s Q (TQ), measured as the market value of equity 
plus total debt, divided by the book value of total assets (Clarkson et al., 2011; Peters & Romi, 
2014). We also control for a firm’s capital expenditure (CAPEX), measured as the ratio of 
annual firm capital expenditures to total assets (Dobler et al., 2015; Moussa et al., 2020). 
Furthermore, we add other governance variables that may influence the extent of corporate 
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ETD. Board size (BSIZE) is the total number of directors on the board (Liao et al., 2015; 
Moussa et al., 2020) and board independence (BINED) is the percentage of independent 
directors on the board (Liao et al., 2015; Tauringana & Chithambo, 2015). Lastly, we also 
control strategic shareholdings (SHOLD), measured as shareholdings of 5% or more (Moussa 
et al., 2020). Table 3 provides a summary of the definitions, measures, and sources of data. 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
3.3. Empirical models 
To test our hypotheses, we use both univariate and multivariate analyses. Univariate analysis 
is done through correlations while a negative binomial regression model is employed to 
conduct the multivariate analysis. During the statistical analysis stage, we found that (i) linear 
and logistic regression models are inappropriate for count data (i.e., ETD scores) that only take 
on non-negative integer values and could lead to both biased and inconsistent coefficient 
estimates (Hilbe, 2011). (ii) The ETD score is an over-dispersed count variable, therefore 
applying the negative binomial regression model would lead to more consistent and less-biased 
estimation results (Cameron & Trivedi, 1998). We also find strong evidence that the negative 
binomial regression model is more appropriate than the Poisson model for our ETD data using 
the likelihood ratio test. Moreover, all regressions are run with robust standard errors clustered 
by firm and using year fixed effects to address cross-sectional dependence or time effects 
(heteroscedasticity). 
We use the following negative binomial regression model to examine the study 
hypotheses: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝐸𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼0𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽1𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐺𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 +
                                             ∑ 𝛽𝑖  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡
10
𝑖=1 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                      (1) 
where ETDit is the aggregated (AETD), soft (SOFT_ETD), semi-hard (SEMI-HARD_ETD), 
or hard (HARD_ETD) environmental targets disclosure scores for firm i in year t. All 
dependent, independent, and control variables in the negative binomial regression model are 





4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
4.1. Trends of ETD: Soft vs. Hard  
Fig. 2 provides an initial picture of the extent of corporate ETDs of U.K. firms over the nine-
year period. The findings show an increase in ETDs from 2005 to 2007, followed by a gradual 
decrease from 2008 to 2013, with the exceptions of 2009 and 2011. Although U.K. firms have 
increased the level of hard ETs more than soft and semi-hard ETs over time, soft and semi-
hard ETs are the most extensive over the nine-year period. One likely explanation for this is 
that U.K. firms tend to comply more with the environmental regulations and guidelines 
(DEFRA, 2013; the Kyoto Protocol, 1997; U.K. Climate Change Act, 2008) because they face 
increased stakeholder and regulator attention. This suggests that firms use ETDs as tools to 
gain social acceptance and legitimize their operations (Alrazi et al., 2016; Deegan & Rankin, 
1996; Hackston et al., 2008) and/or manage stakeholder impressions on environmental 
performance (Cooper & Slack, 2015; Leung et al., 2015; Talbot & Boiral 2016).  
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
To add depth to the overall results, Table 4 (Panel A) provides a detailed analysis of 
what type of ETs companies disclosed over time. The results show that, on average, a 
substantial proportion of the largest U.K. firms is likely to set and disclose qualitative soft (ET1 
– 20%,) and semi-hard timed targets (ET2 – 36%) compared to semi-hard quantitative (ET3 – 
4%) and hard targets (ET4 – 40%). Further, it is clear that firms gradually increase their level 
of hard target disclosures, reaching about 47% of ETDs in 2013 from 35% in 2005. The results 
also indicate that soft and semi-hard targets are the most frequently disclosed ones. These 
results provide further support that ETDs are largely qualitative with or without specific 
timeframes.  
Panels B, C, and D of Table 4 illustrate ETDs across high, medium, and low 
environmentally sensitive industries. On average, firms in HESI appear to be less willing to 
provide more semi-hard quantifiable and hard ET information (35%), compared with firms in 
MESI (38%) and LESI (48%). This result empirically supports the findings of Maas (2018) 
that suggest HESI firms setting and reporting qualitative, soft targets are more likely to be 
involved in a form of greenwashing intended to manage stakeholders’ perceptions and gain or 
maintain legitimacy. For MESI firms, approximately 23% and 39% of ETDs are largely 
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focused on soft and semi-hard target information, respectively, compared with 38% on hard 
target information (Panel C of Table 4). Interestingly, Panel D of Table 4 indicates that ETDs 
in LESI firms are largely quantitative with specific timeframes. For example, while only 18% 
and 34% of those ETDs focus on soft and semi-hard target information, respectively, 
approximately 48% focus on hard targets. This indicates that managers in firms such as banks 
and other financial institutions are more likely to disclose more semi-hard quantitative and hard 
ETDs (e.g., KPMG, 2015). Our results are also in line with stakeholder and legitimacy 
perspectives that good performers (the good apples) exhibit more semi-hard quantitative and 
hard ETDs to renew their social licenses and maintain the support of stakeholders (Alrazi et 
al., 2016; Deegan, 2007; Helfaya & Moussa, 2017; Tilt, 2007). 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
It seems that U.K. firms, particularly HESI firms, are likely to disclose, on average, 
higher levels of symbolic targets (i.e. soft and semi-hard ETs) that could result in failures to 
guide, motivate, or control target groups and meet targets. This evidence corroborates previous 
studies (Bowen & Wittneben, 2011; Kolk & Perego 2014; Maxwell et al., 2015) that suggest 
that setting and reporting these types of ETs is mainly symbolic and used to minimize 
regulatory risks. Furthermore, soft and semi-hard ETs aim for merely incremental 
improvements. In these cases, ETDs serve as an impression management tool. These results 
are consistent with the prior empirical findings of Cooper and Slack (2015), Leung et al. (2015) 
and Maas (2016). Our results suggest that managers could use ETDs as an assertive tactic to 
manage the perception of their stakeholders or as a defensive tactic to justify poor 
environmental performance and communicate plans for improvements.  
4.2. ETD based on GRI Performance Areas and Measurement  
Table 5 shows the analysis of ETDs for each GRI environmental performance category. The 
most disclosed target performance categories are environmental grievance mechanisms 
(EGMs) at (17.36%); GHG emissions (16.85%); effluents and waste (12.50%); and energy 
(12.09%). Specifically, nearly 41% of ETs relate to GHG emissions, effluents and waste, and 
energy, reflecting the intention of U.K. companies to legitimize their existence by responding 
to regulatory and stakeholder pressures through various strategies and disclosures related to 
these categories. However, it does not necessarily reflect an improvement in substantive 
environmental performance (Cooper & Slack 2015; Leung et al. 2015; Talbot & Boiral 2016). 
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In terms of EGMs, we find that the majority of the sampled firms representing polluting 
industries (e.g., oil and gas, utilities and mining) tend to develop and disclose targets for this 
category. This suggests that firms may use EGMs disclosures to manage stakeholder 
perceptions, (Hrasky, 2012; Neu et al., 1998; Tauringana & Chithambo, 2015) and/or as 
marketing tools to sell superficial environmental performance to the public (Ascui & Lovell, 
2011; Deegan, 2004). For example, Tullow Oil plc with its high and negative environmental 
impacts had, on average, 26 targets for EGMs but no targets for energy, emissions, and 
transport.  
Further, the results show that firms pay less attention to compliance (0.97%) and 
biodiversity (4.40%), implying that the vast majority of these firms do not disclose information 
on fines for non-compliance and biodiversity impacts. This largely supports the perspective of 
impression management that suggests firms focus on symbolic commitments rather than on 
disclosing the adverse impacts of their activities. Similarly, less than 1% of the ETs focus on 
environmental protection expenditures and investments. This confirms the results of past 
studies (Cooper & Slack 2015; Boiral, 2016) that suggest that firms tend to make more 
symbolic ETDs to enhance their social legitimacy rather than to focus on substantive future 
plans for green investments that require the strategic commitment of financial, personnel, and 
technological resources. 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
As shown in Fig. 3, we further analyze ETD behavior with particular attention to its 
measurement. The use of absolute ETs (85%, 1,464 targets) is much higher than intensity ETs 
(15%, 258 targets). This supports previous research (Byrd et al., 2013; Margolick & Russell, 
2001) that suggested that absolute ETs are consistent with international and national 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. In contrast, setting intensity targets is more useful to 
stakeholders because that facilitates the comparison of environmental performance among 
firms. This supports our multi-theoretical framework that U.K. firms exhibit greater disclosure 
of absolute ETs to signal compliance with international and government initiatives and rules, 
and thereby maintain or enhance corporate legitimacy.  




4.3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 6 provides descriptive statistics for the variables in our analysis. All distributions 
generally show a wide range and variability, minimizing any possibility of sample selection 
bias. Panel A of Table 6 provides summary statistics for the aggregate, per-industry, and per-
category ETD scores. The results indicate that the mean value of the AETD is 12.13 with a 
standard deviation of 20.48 on a range of 0-166, suggesting that the AETD of the sampled 
firms is quite low. It also shows that the mean value of AETD is much lower for HESI firms 
(9.48) than MESI (13.29) and LESI (15.37) firms. Moreover, a similar pattern can be observed 
for the three ETD categories. For example, polluting industries have the lowest score of hard 
ETDs (HARD_ETD). This provides further support that HESI firms have higher levels of 
symbolic ETs than other industries. 
For the independent and control variables, Panel B of Table 6 shows that the average 
environmental performance score (ENVP) is 75.13%, with a minimum of 14.74% and a 
maximum of 97.08%. Further, 54.05% of the sampled firms on average adopt GRI guidelines 
when preparing CSR reports and 52.11% provide assurance statements (SA). A similar result 
was documented by KPMG (2015), which found that 63% of G250 companies invest in 
external assurance of CSR reports. The existence of a sustainability committee (SC) seems to 
be a common practice given that on average 79.04% of the sampled firms maintained a 
sustainability committee during the nine-year period.  
In terms of company specific variables, 58.56% of firms have a standalone 
sustainability report (SR). The mean for total assets (FSIZE) of the sample firms is 16.15 (about 
£82.2 billion) and the mean for profitability (ROE) and leverage (LEV) is 27.29% and 23.05%, 
respectively. Furthermore, the means of other control variables are 1.40 for Tobin’s Q (TQ); 
4.37% for CAPEX; and 9.5% for the financial slack resources (SLACK). For corporate 
governance variables, we find that the sampled firms average 11 members on their boards with 
a minimum of 5 and maximum of 21, which is comparable with Liao et al.’s (2015) study. On 
average, independent directors (BINED) represent only 49.25 % of the board. This raises 
doubts as to the effectiveness of the U.K. Corporate Governance Code in improving the quality 
and functioning of corporate boards. The sample firms have low levels of ownership 
concentration (SHOLD) with a mean of 14.76%.  
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
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Table 7 shows the correlations matrix among the dependent, independent, and control 
variables. The Pearson correlation coefficients for AETD are statistically significant and 
positively related to exploratory variables (i.e., SC, GRI, SA, and ENVP) but negatively related 
to the ESI, supporting research hypotheses H1, H2, H3, and H4. Moreover, the correlation 
matrix among all the independent variables is low, suggesting that no major multicollinearity 
problems exist. 
[TABLE 7 HERE] 
4.4. Multivariate Results  
Table 8 shows the negative binomial regression results of Eq. (1) for the AETD and its 
classifications. Model 1 is for the AETD and Models 2–4 are for the three different 
classifications of AETD (i.e., SOFT_ETD, SEMI-HARD_ETD, and HARD_ETD). We find 
that sustainability committee (SC), GRI guidelines (GRI), and sustainability assurance (SA) 
are statistically significant and positively associated with AETD, SEMI-HARD_ETD, and 
HARD_ETD, suggesting that H1, H2, and H3 are empirically supported. This indicates that 
firms that adopt environmental governance mechanisms (i.e., the sustainability committee, GRI 
framework, and sustainability assurance) exhibit greater semi-hard and hard ETs to address 
environmental risks and engage with stakeholders (Mahoney et al., 2013; Peters & Romi, 2014, 
2015). These results are consistent with previous studies (Comyns, 2016; Helfaya & Moussa, 
2017; Jaggi et al., 2017; Moussa et al., 2020; O’Dwyer et al., 2011; Peters & Romi, 2014; 
Thorne et al., 2014) that found positive influences of sustainability committees, GRI 
guidelines, and sustainability assurances on corporate environmental strategies, disclosures, 
and performances. This is largely in line with the stakeholder and legitimacy arguments that 
firms adopt environmental governance mechanisms as public relations tools to respond to 
stakeholder information needs and maintain corporate legitimacy, license, and reputation 
(Michelon et al., 2015; Mahoney et al., 2013; Helfaya & Moussa, 2017; Thorne et al., 2014). 
Overall, these results imply that sustainability committees, GRI frameworks, and sustainability 
assurances promote corporate ETDs, mainly semi-hard and hard ETDs, to address stakeholders 
concerns and defend corporate social legitimacy but do not necessarily lead to an improvement 
in environmental performance (Comyns, 2016; Jaggi et al., 2017; Mahoney et al., 2013).  
Moreover, as shown in Table 8, we find a positive and significant relationship between 
the firm’s environmental performance (ENVP) and hard ETDs, implying that hypothesis H4 is 
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partially supported for this type of ET. This result is consistent with prior studies (Al-Tuwaijri 
et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008; Herbohn et al., 2014; Meng et al., 2014; Tadros & Magnan, 
2019) that suggested that high environmental performers are significantly related to highly 
extensive quantifiable environmental disclosures. However, our results indicate that there is no 
relationship between a firm’s environmental performance and the other three measures of 
ETDs (AETD, SOFT_ETD, and SEMI-HARD_ETD). This evidence offers empirical support 
for the results of Cooper and Slack (2015) and Boiral (2013; 2016) that suggest firms tend to 
focus on symbolic or ceremonial sustainability reporting largely disconnected with the 
environmental impact of their activities to manage stakeholder perceptions. These results are 
consistent with impression management theory, which indicates firms tend to disclose 
ambiguous, non-measurable (qualitative), and/or ETs without timelines not to make an impact 
on their environmental performance but to enhance corporate legitimacy by signaling concern 
for the environment. Thus, ETDs could represent a hyper-reality where U.K. firms use soft and 
semi-hard ETs to enhance their image without real and concrete commitments to improving 
environmental performance. 
Furthermore, our results (see Models 1 and 4 of Table 8) suggest that U.K. firms with 
lower pollution outputs (LESI and MESI) disclose higher levels of aggregated and hard ETDs. 
This is in line with legitimacy and stakeholder theories, which suggest that firms representing 
low-polluting industries (good environmental performers) are likely to provide high-quality 
disclosures in the form of specific, measurable, and time-bound ETs to maintain their positive 
image and conform to stakeholder expectations (Meng et al., 2014). Conversely, U.K. HESI 
firms are likely to provide lower levels of aggregated and hard ETDs. These results do not 
provide support for H5 but are consistent with impression management theory that suggests 
HESI firms may set and disclose more soft and semi-hard targets to manage the perception of 
stakeholders without taking substantive actions (Boiral, 2016; Clarkson et al., 2008; Meng et 
al. 2014). Accordingly, firms that set relatively symbolic targets seem unlikely to improve 
actual environmental performance. The implication is that there is an urgent need for prescribed 
regulations with explicit industry-specific guidelines and enforcement mechanisms to 
encourage companies to set and disclose hard ETs and reduce their environmental impacts.  
Among the control variables, the issuance of a standalone sustainability report (SR) has 
significant positive relationships with AETD and its classifications. This is consistent with 
previous studies (Helfaya & Moussa, 2017; Patten & Zhao, 2014; Mahoney et al., 2013) that 
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suggest firms publishing standalone SRs tend to make more environmental disclosures, 
although these tend to focus more on soft and semi-hard environmental targets. This indicates 
that soft and unclear ETs can be used as an impression management technique to manage 
stakeholder perceptions and improve corporate image without showing clear and measurable 
targets (Boiral, 2016; Cooper & Slack, 2015; Leung et al., 2015; Talbot & Boiral, 2016). Table 
8 also shows that firm size (FSIZE), financial slack (SLACK), and capital expenditure 
(CAPEX) have significantly positive relationships with AETD, SEMI-HARD_ETD, and 
HARD_ETD. This offers empirical support for the findings of Alrazi et al. (2016), Liao et al. 
(2015), and Tauringana and Chithambo (2015) that suggest large firms, high financial slack 
firms, and/or firms with higher capital expenditures are more likely to invest in sustainability 
activities, leading to an improvement in their ETDs. In addition, the results show that board 
independence BINED is significant and positively related to AETD, SEMI-HARD_ETD, and 
HARD_ETD, indicating that boards with more independent directors tend to put pressure on 
managers to commit to higher levels of ETDs (Liao et al., 2015). 
[TABLE 8 HERE] 
4.5. Robustness Checks  
We perform a range of sensitivity analyses to ascertain the robustness of our results. First, to 
investigate if the findings are sensitive to winsorization (Haque, 2017), we rerun our models 
by winsorizing all data at 1% and 99%. The results are similar to those shown in Table 8. 
Secondly, following Post et al. (2015), we lag independent and control variables by one year 
to additionally address potential endogeneity problems so that ETDs and each environmental 
governance or environmental performance may be determined simultaneously. The results 
presented in Models 1 to 4 of Table 9 are generally consistent with the results reported in Table 
8. To examine whether our results are sensitive to the GRI proxy, we re-estimate Eq. (1) using 
an alternative measure for GRI that is defined as a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the 
company’s sustainability reporting accords to GRI guidelines and 0 if otherwise. As shown in 
Model 5 of Table 9, the results remain largely the same as those shown in Model 1 of Table 8. 
Next, as the environmental sensitivity of industries is categorized differently (Prado-Lorenzo 
et al., 2009; Tauringana & Chithambo, 2015), we rerun our analysis by reclassifying the 
environmental sensitivity of industries into two categories (i.e., perceived as having high 
environmental risks or not). The results reported in Model 6 of Table 9 remain unchanged in 
terms of sign and significances.  
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Finally, we take a number of steps to ensure that potential endogeneity is not an issue 
in our results. As described earlier, we controlled many plausible alternative factors that 
influence ETDs. Moreover, following Bednar et al. (2013) and Sahayma et al. (2016), we test 
for endogeneity in our regression models by calculating the correlation between the residual 
error terms with each of the direct effects of independent variables. In econometrics, an 
endogeneity problem arises when the residual error term is significantly correlated with the 
explanatory variables (Bascle, 2008). Our results (untabulated) indicate that all the error term 
correlations are low and statistically insignificant, thus proving that our results do not have an 
endogeneity problem.  
[TABLE 9 HERE] 
5. Conclusion 
This study investigates the extent of corporate ETDs and empirically examines whether 
environmental governance mechanisms and environmental performance influence ETDs. 
Based on a sample of U.K. FTSE 100 firms over the 2005-2013 period, we find that firms show 
a large degree of variability and inconsistency in their ETs reporting. There is an increasing 
trend in the use of hard ETs information. However, soft and semi-hard ETs remain the most 
extensive types of disclosures, particularly in highly environmentally sensitive firms, implying 
that firms that set and report symbolic targets are likely to be involved in a form of 
greenwashing intended to manage stakeholder perceptions.  
We also find that U.K. firms tend to focus on particular environmental areas, namely, 
GHG emissions, effluents and waste, and energy. This reflects the intention of U.K. companies 
to legitimize their existence by responding to regulatory and stakeholder pressures (e.g., the 
U.K. Climate Change Act 2008) through various strategies and ETDs related to energy 
consumption and use, waste, and GHG emissions. However, it does not necessarily reflect an 
improvement in substantive environmental performance. Our results also suggest that U.K. 
firms pay less attention to ETDs on fines for non-compliance, environmental protection 
expenditures, and biodiversity impacts. This largely supports impression management theory 
that states firms may focus on symbolic commitments rather than substantive future plans for 
green investments that require the strategic commitment of financial, personnel, and 
technological resources. Additionally, sustainability committees, GRI guidelines, and 
sustainability assurances are important factors in enhancing ETDs. The results also show that 
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firms with good environmental performance are likely to set and disclose hard targets. These 
results support the stakeholder, legitimacy, and impression management theories.  
Our results have significant implications. For policy-makers and regulators, it is 
important to note that the U.K.’s policy landscape is a ‘market-based governance system’ in 
which ‘firms decide, at the discretion of their management, to volunteer in industry- or 
government-sponsored sustainability programs’ (Liao et al., 2015, p. 13). Therefore, if this kind 
of voluntary disclosure is to be improved, there is a need for regulations with explicit industry-
specific guidelines that will not only enhance the usefulness of disclosures (i.e., more hard 
targets) but also encourage companies to take serious proactive action to reduce their 
environmental impacts. The development of guidelines and rules could possibly lead to what 
is characterized by Andrew and Cortese (2011, p. 137) as a ‘win-win’ solution. Companies win 
because they have better identified and managed their environmental risks and opportunities. 
Investors win because they are aware of the progress of companies toward national ETs and, 
therefore, better allocation of their resources. The planet also wins because these guidelines 
and rules will create more environmentally responsible business practices. However, before 
moving to a compulsory regime, companies need time to gain experience, highlighting the role 
of non-governmental organizations (e.g., GRI) in providing the framework for regulations and 
assisting companies to set and disclose high-quality and nationally aligned ETs. 
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first of its kind. The results indicate that 
researchers should engage in discussions beyond describing corporate environmental 
disclosures. There is scant country- and industry-based empirical research on ETDs and in-
depth case studies on how companies set and monitor their ETs. Moreover, there is a need to 
fully understand why companies choose to respond, or not, to non-governmental environmental 
initiatives and whether various existing environmental guidelines and schemes can help steer 
useful information into reports. In addition, a practical implication is that both investors and 
environmental activists could use the positive link between the extent of ETDs and 
environmental performance as an argument to encourage companies to set and disclose hard 
targets. Finally, there is also a need to assess environmental performance and how companies 
set targets to minimize their impacts on society and the environment. 
This study has some limitations and avenues for future research. Firstly, further 
research could replicate our study using other countries with different institutional and cultural 
contexts. Secondly, given that our study focuses on the extent of corporate ETDs, further 
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research could examine firms’ social and governance targets and their impacts on performance. 
Thirdly, this study focuses on disclosures without tracking the levels of achieving ETs. 
Therefore, tracking and measuring the achievement level of disclosed ETs could be a further 
avenue for research. Fourthly, the United Nations (UN) has set out 17 Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) and adopted the strategic plan for global sustainable development 2015-2030 
(United Nations, 2015). These SDGs include the three dimensions of sustainable development: 
the economic, social and environmental which outline guidelines, action plans and targets for 
countries, firms and all stakeholders to move towards a sustainable and equitable society. We, 
therefore, believe that there is a need to raise awareness of these 17 UN SDGs among firms to 
invest in sustainable development which will have positive long-term implications for 
humanity and the environment. Correspondingly, accounting practitioners and researchers 
have much to do to the pursuit of the 17 UN SDGs by tracking and measuring the achievement 
level of these SDGs. Finally, another potential research area is whether the use of ETs actually 
improves a firm’s environmental performance. 
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1. Coding unit: Environmental 
Targets (ETs) 
Defining the term “target” as a specific future performance 
objective (e.g. Haffar & Searcy, 2018) 
Adopting GRI sustainability reporting guidelines to identify 
environmental-related targets. 
Searching and analysing the content of the sustainability 
reports, sustainability section in annual reports or whole 
annual reports to identify all ETs. 
2. Coding scheme: ETs categories 





Qualitative environmental target, and 
no timeframe (ET1), is scored with 1. 
Qualitative environmental target with 
timeframe (ET2), is scored with 2 
 
Quantitative environmental target, and 
no timeframe (ET3), is scored with 3. 
 
Quantitative and timed environmental 
target (ET4), is scored with 4. 
 
 
4. Measuring an aggregate score for the environmental targets disclosures (AETD) for each firm.  
 























Fig.2. The extent of  corporate ETD (2005-2013)
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Table 1. Sample selection and industry composition 
Panel (A) Sample selection                                                                          
                                                        Firm-observations 
UK FTSE100 firms for the period 2005 - 2013 
Less: 
Firm-year observations without sustainability/annual reports                            





Total firm-year observations available  823 
Panel (B) Industry composition 
Industrial classification benchmark  No. of firms  No of firm-
observations 
Percent 
Oil and Gas   5    44   5.35 
Basic Materials   9    68   8.26 
Industrials 18  157 19.08 
Consumer Goods 11    99 12.03 
Health Care   4    36   4.37 
Consumer Services 19  163 19.81 
Telecommunications   2    16   1.94 
Utilities   5    45   5.47 
Financials 21 177 21.50 
Technology   2    18   2.19 





















Table 2. Examples of corporate ETDs coding rules application 
 










“10% reduction in carbon 
intensity (CO2 emissions per unit 
of production) over the period 
2005 to 2014, (2004 base year) for 













“Reduce the overall waste 













“Reduce UK paper use by 10%” 
(SR, 2009, p.13) 
 
Materials Quantitative target 




GlaxoSmithKline “Reduction in GSK’s operational 
water consumption by 20% by 
2015 (SR, 2010, p.155) 
 





Mondi “Increase the proportion of fibre-
based products which is certified 
against a credible forestry 


















Kingfisher “Achieve a 20% reduction in 
carbon emissions from dedicated 
store delivery and home delivery 
fleets (tones CO2 equivalent) 
from a 2010/11 baseline by 2020” 
(SR, 2012, p.17) 
 





Kingfisher “Enhance biodiversity on new-
build projects, major 
refurbishments and existing stores 
by 2020” (SR, 2013, p.47) 
 





Lloyds Bank “Invest £7 million in energy 












Coca-Cola HBC “Extend Green IT and eco-driving 


















Table 3. Summary of variables definitions, measures, and source of data 
 
Variable  Acronym Definition/Measurement Source  
Aggregated ETs 
disclosure 
AETD Total weighted score of all environmental 
targets disclosure.  
SRs/ARs  
Soft ETs disclosure SOFT_ETD Total weighted score of generic environmental 
target disclosure, not quantified, and no time 
period. 
SRs/ARs  
Semi-hard ETs disclosure SEMI-
HARD_ETD 
Total weighted score of either timed 
environmental target but not quantified or 
quantified environmental target but not timed. 
SRs/ARs  
Hard ETs disclosure HARD_ETD Total weighted score of quantified and timed 
environmental target disclosures. 
SRs/ARs  
Sustainability committee  SC A dummy variable taking 1 if a company has a 
sustainability committee or a director in charge 









Sustainability assurance SA A dummy variable taking 1 if there is 







ENVP The aggregate environmental performance 





of the industry 
ESI Three dummy variables, representing high, 
medium, and low environmentally sensitive 
industries (LESI, MESI and HESI) (all take the 





SR A dummy variable taking 1 if a company 
issues a stand-alone SR, and 0 otherwise.  
Company 
website 
Firm size  
 
FSIZE The natural logarithm of firm assets. DataStream  
Profitability  
 
ROE The ratio of net income to total equity. DataStream 
Leverage  
 
LEV The ratio of total debt to total assets. DataStream 
Tobin’s Q 
 
TQ The market value of equity plus total debts 
divided by book value of total assets. 
 
DataStream 
Capital Expenditure  
 
CAPEX The ratio of capital expenditures to total assets DataStream 
Financial Slack 
 
SLACK The ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets 
 
DataStream 
Board size  
 
BSIZE Total number of directors on the board. DataStream 
Board Independence 
 





SHOLD The percentage of total shares in issue of 5% or 






Table 4.  Soft, semi-hard and hard environmental targets disclosures according to level of environmental sensitivity of industries  
       2005–2013 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 
Panel A:  All UK FTSE100 companies (FTSE100— Number of targets and % of total sub-targets) 



























































































































Panel B:  High environmentally sensitive industries (HESI—Number of targets and % of total sub-targets)  



































































































































Panel C:  Medium environmentally sensitive industries (MESI— Number of targets and % of total sub-targets)  



























































































































Panel D:  Low environmentally sensitive industries (LESI— Number of targets and % of total sub-targets)  


























































































































Notes: ET1: Environmental target disclosed, not quantified, and no time period specified, ET3: Environmental target disclosed, quantified, and no time period, ET4: 




Table 5. An analysis of corporate ETDs based on GRI performance areas  
 
GRI Performance areas  Full 
Sample 
  Panel (A): Analysis by Year Panel (B): Analysis by Industry 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 HESI MESI LESI 
Environmental Grievance 
Mechanisms (EGMs) 
679 79 88 100 86 87 75 74 53 37  276 221 182 
Emissions 659 59 74 92 77 85 57 77 71 67 216 301 142 
Effluents and Waste 489 61 73 63 53 56 52 49 49 33 159 178 152 
Energy 473 62 46 67 50 70 52 44 37 45 140 174 159 
Materials 368 45 60 54 25 37 35 59 26 27 112 149 107 
Supplier Environmental 
Assessment 
307 24 50 29 39 47 30 27 30 31 83 141 83 
Water 268 28 31 24 27 32 32 35 30 29 117 71 80 
Products and Services 257 21 39 42 26 25 17 31 40 16 105 137 15 
Biodiversity 172 26 20 19 19 25 14 15 24 10 66 58 48 
Transport 167 12 19 35 20 25 20  14 9 13 21 70 76 
Compliance 38 3 8 4 3  2 4 4 3 7 25 12 1 
Environmental protection 
expenditures and investments  
34 3 2 7 6 1 1 9 3 2 11 11 12 
Total  3911 423 510 536 431 492 389 438 375 317 1331 1523 1057 
Note: We classify industry effects into three categories: high environmental sensitive industries (HESI) which include chemicals, paper, metals, petroleum, mining, tobacco, 
general industry, and utility industries, medium environmental sensitive industries (MESI) which include communication, health care, travel and leisure, media, and 











Table 6. Descriptive statistics of regression variables 
       Full Sample  HESI MESI LESI 
 Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD 
Panel A: Types of environmental targets disclosures 
AETD 12.13 0.00 166.00 20.48 9.48 0.00 159.00 14.69 13.29 0.00 166.00 23.61 15.37 0.00 154.00 23.94 
SOFT_ETD  0.89 0.00 15.00 2.05 0.62 0.00 13.00 1.58 1.17 0.00 15.00 2.52 0.98 0.00 10.00 2.00 
SMEI-
HARD_ETD 
3.90 0.00 122.00 8.91 3.69 0.00 47.00 6.87 4.12 0.00 122.00 11.62 3.94 0.00 52.00 7.44 
HARD_ETD 7.34 0.00 120.00 15.05 5.16 0.00 108.00 10.41 8.00 0.00 100.00 15.78 10.45 0.00 120.00 19.97 
Panel B: Independent and control variables 
SC (%) 79.04 0.00 100.00 40.73 83.61 0.00 100.00 37.07 71.86 0.00 100.00 45.04 81.35 0.00 100.00 39.10 
GRI (%) 54.05 22.18 99.97 31.74 60.88 22.18 99.97 32.71 48.95 22.18 99.97 30.12 48.90 22.18 99.97 29.92 
SA (%) 52.11 0.00 100.00 49.98 64.48 0.00 100.00 47.92 38.98 0.00 100.00 48.85 48.70 0.00 100.00 50.11 
ENVP (%) 75.13 14.74 97.08 21.49 70.78 15.62 96.41 22.84 75.88 14.74 96.83 21.73 78.23 15.57 97.08 19.63 
SR (%) 58.56 0.00 100.00 49.29 55.56 0.00 100.00 49.76 57.91 0.00 100.00 49.45 65.15 0.00 100.00 47.77 
FSIZE (Ln) 16.15 11.26 21.60 1.87 16.03 12.47 19.26 1.41 15.37 12.87 18.87 1.19 17.54 11.26 21.60 2.57 
ROE (%) 27.29 -33.81 354.03 46.19 25.18 -33.81 354.03 27.16 37.63 -33.81 354.03 69.51 15.70 -33.81 93.26 20.66 
LEV (%) 23.05 0.00 60.26 15.13 23.84 0.00 60.26 14.44 28.63 0.00 60.26 13.25 13.13 0.00 60.26 14.26 
TQ  1.40 0.02 11.99 1.27 1.56 0.15 7.99 0.97 1.54 0.07 9.79 1.06 0.88 0.02 11.99 1.80 
CAPEX  4.37 0.00 28.11 4.46 5.37 0.00 28.11 4.18 5.32 0.40 24.73 4.84 1.07 0.00 12.84 2.23 
SLACK  9.54 0.00 92.44 10.52 10.46 0.00 44.07 9.40 8.62 0.00 43.17 8.10 9.21 0.00 92.44 15.34 
BSIZE  11.08 5.00 21.00 2.58 10.92 6.00 17.00 2.30 10.60 5.00 18.00 2.57 12.11 5.00 21.00 2.81 
BINED (%) 49.25 3.98 94.55 17.35 50.86 4.70 91.41 17.39 47.93 7.12 91.88 17.16 48.30 3.98 95.00 17.42 
SHOLD (%) 14.76 0.00 77.00 17.65 13.03 0.00 77.00 17.30 15.91 0.00 72.00 16.42 16.24 0.00 70.00 19.81 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Aggregated environmental targets disclosures (AETD); Soft ET disclosures (SOFT_ETD); Semi-hard ET disclosures (SMEI-HARD_ETD); Hard ET disclosures 
(HARD_ETD); Existence of sustainability committee (SC); Adoption of GRI sustainability reporting guidelines (GRI); Inclusion of sustainability assurance (SA);; Environmental performance (ENVP); 
issuance of stand-alone sustainability reporting (SR); Firm size (FSIZE); Firm profitability (ROE); Leverage (LEV); Tobin’s Q (TQ); Capital expenditure (CAPEX); Financial slack (SLACK); Board 
size (BSIZE); Board independence (BINED) and Strategic shareholdings (SHOLD). All variables are fully defined in Table 3 
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Table 7. Pearson’s correlation matrix 
     Notes: Table 3 fully defines all the variables used.  P-values are in parentheses. 
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Table 8. Negative binomial regression results of environmental governance and 
performance on the extent of corporate ETDs 
All variables are fully defined in Table 3. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively 











 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 
 






SC  + 0.442** 




(0.012)   
0.417* 
(0.090)  





(0.061)    
0.156* 
(0.064) 
SA   + 0.381*** 






(0.042)   























(0.004)   
SR   1.005*** 




(0.000)   
0.938*** 
(0.000) 







(0.004)   
























CAPEX  0.002*** 















BSIZE  -0.141* 







BINED  .175*** 




(0.011)    
0.193** 
(0.036) 


























Cluster by firm  Yes Yes Yes Yes 



































measure of GRI 
AETD with 
alternative 
measure of ESI  
SC  + 0.464** 








(0.014)    
0.437** 
(0.017)    












SA   + 0.402*** 






(0.005)   
0.371*** 
(0.005)    
0.376*** 
(0.004)    















































(0.013)    
SR   0.643*** 








(0.000)    
1.033*** 
(0.000)    
















































CAPEX  0.001*** 








(0.000)   
0.003*** 
(0.000)   












BSIZE  -0.165* 








(0.074)   
-0.130 
(0.116)   
BINED  0.239** 








(0.008)    
0.144** 
(0.033)    









































 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2  19.7 5.4 11.3 15.6 23.2 22.6 
Wald Chi2  177.93*** 55.2*** 95.53*** 175.92*** 237.93*** 225.71*** 
N  732 732 732 732 823 823 
All variables are fully defined in Table 3. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively 
(all two-tailed). P-values are in parentheses. 
 
